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Christine Haight Farley, Confronting Expectations: Women in the Legal
Academy, 8 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 333, 348 (1996); (quoting Frances Olsen,
The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS Oꜰ LAW 453, 454 (David Kairys ed. 1990)).
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INTRODUCTION

There is a place that exists – a place that is free from liability
for any harmful harassment, willful and wanton untruths, as well as
malicious lies and tortious acts.2 This place protects, with impunity,
offenders of domestic violence (“DV”) who choose to enter its
doors to continue abusing their victims.3 This place is a safe haven
for continued DV because every threatening, intimidating, and
demeaning publication directed toward a DV victim is absolutely
privileged and perfectly legal.4 This place, commonly referred to as
the local courthouse, strictly obeys the common law rule of absolute
privilege. Absolute privilege, a legal doctrine grounded in public
policy which can be traced back to medieval England, allows DV
abusers unfettered, legal access to their victims. 5 Absolute
2

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1997) (“[T]he privilege is absolute .
. . irrespective of [the attorney’s] purpose in publishing the defamatory matter,
his belief in its truth, or even his knowledge of its falsity.”).
3
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1997) (as long as the continued
abuse concerns communications related to preliminary or continuing judicial
proceedings); Donna J. King, Naming the Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé of an
Abuser's Successful Use of a Judicial Proceeding for Continued Domestic
Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153,168-69 (2012) (emphasis
added).
4
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1997) (“An attorney at law is
absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in
communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the
institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which
he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.”); Donna J.
King, Naming the Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé of an Abuser's Successful Use of
a Judicial Proceeding for Continued Domestic Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE
GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153,168-69 (2012).
5
See Simms v. Seaman, 69 A.3d 880, 885 (Conn. 2013)(The privilege is
considered “as old as the law itself.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586
(1997); Donna J. King, Naming the Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé of an Abuser's
Successful Use of a Judicial Proceeding for Continued Domestic Violence, 1
TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153,168-69 (2012) (explaining that absolute
privilege allows even pro se litigants access to the courts for the purposes of
harassing and threatening litigation tactics without fear of consequences)
(emphasis added).
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privilege’s main purpose is to “secur[e for] attorneys as officers of
the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for
their clients.”6 The privilege applies “irrespective of the [attorney’s]
purpose in publishing the defamatory matter, his belief in its truth,
or even his knowledge of its falsity[,]” making it the perfect weapon
for a DV offender to deploy against his victim.7
Since the founding of the United States, women have been,
and continue to be, institutionally and systematically discriminated
against, particularly within American society and its judicial
system. 8 From the common law doctrine of coverture and court
sanctioned sex-discrimination, to the suffrage movement and faultbased divorce, women experience discrimination by men in a
variety of ways and means.9 Prior to the U.S. Civil War, women had
6

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1997).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1997); accord, see generally
Simms v. Seaman, 69 A.3d 880 (Conn. 2013) (explaining the history behind the
privilege and the rationale for the absolute immunity afforded attorneys in
relation to their representation of their clients). See Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788
P.2d 941, 952 (Okla. 1990) (The privilege applies as long as the defamatory
matter or statements bear some relationship or relevance to the contemplated or
existing judicial proceeding.). See also Donna J. King, Naming the Judicial
Terrorist: An Exposé of an Abuser's Successful Use of a Judicial Proceeding for
Continued Domestic Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153, 16869 (2012) (It is a well-known fact that both men and women, whether in
heterosexual or homosexual relationships, experience DV as victims and
offenders. While DV against men is a known issue, the credible social science
statistics show that women experience DV much more often than men. This
article focuses on the female DV victim but does not ignore the fact that male DV
victimization exists as well).
8
See, e.g., Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making
about Divorce Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 145, 148 (2003); see generally Donna J. King, Naming the
Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé of an Abuser's Successful Use of a Judicial
Proceeding for Continued Domestic Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC.
JUST. 153 (2012).
9
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex
Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 59 (2011); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and
Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1, 14 (1987); Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex
Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L.
REV. 265, 266 (1984); Claudia Zaher, When a Woman’s Marital Status
7
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little, if any, liberty to change their economic, political, and social
status under the U.S. Constitution or through the American legal
systems.10 However, once the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution was ratified in 1868, women’s legal opportunities were
expected to improve because the Amendment includes a clause
guaranteeing all persons “equal protection of the laws.”11 Yet, its
spirit – equality of rights for all persons – has been systematically
denied to women within the patriarchal framework of U.S.
jurisprudence and social culture, its ratification did effect U.S.
Supreme Court doctrine regarding its interpretation of the concept
of liberty. 12 Nevertheless, this new concept of liberty did not
immediately take effect for women, nor did it provide them the
rights they believed they gained under the Fourteenth Amendment
and the subsequent ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in
1920. 13 Indeed, during the century following the Amendment’s
ratification, the common thread among the Supreme Court sexdiscrimination case holdings was the justification that genderbiased state laws were necessary to protect women, rationalizing
Determined Her Legal Status: A Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine
of Coverture, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 459, 460-61 (2002).
10
See Donna J. King, Naming the Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé of an Abuser's
Successful Use of a Judicial Proceeding for Continued Domestic Violence, 1
TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153,161 & n.53 (2012) (explaining the
masculine ideal of liberty and its effects on women’s opportunities for liberty).
11
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; accord, see generally Reva B. Siegel, She the
People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family,
115 HARV. L. REV. 958 (2002).
12
See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 327 (1937) (explaining that the
Court had enlarged its judgment of the domain of liberty to include that of mind
as well as of action); Donna J. King, Naming the Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé
of an Abuser's Successful Use of a Judicial Proceeding for Continued Domestic
Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153, 161 & n.53 (2012);
Wildman, supra note 9 (emphasis added).
13
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Donna J. King, Naming the Judicial Terrorist:
An Exposé of an Abuser's Successful Use of a Judicial Proceeding for Continued
Domestic Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153, 161-62 & n.53
(2012); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323,
1372 (2006).
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that their main purpose in life was to serve their husbands and
families in a private, domestic sphere. 14 It was not until Reed v.
Reed that the Supreme Court utilized the Fourteenth Amendment,
for the first time, to rule that a state law was violative on the basis
of sex discrimination.15
The legal system’s inability to recognize and redress the
unique harms, including trauma, experienced by women in matters
concerning DV is particularly pervasive throughout the United
States. 16 Societal acceptance of male power and control over
women exposes women to DV in alarmingly high numbers,
resulting in most DV victims experiencing debilitating trauma. 17
Similarly to defining domestic violence, the field of trauma has
14

See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 388, 395 (1937)
(determining that women were in need of “the state’s protective power” when
upholding legislation that singled out women); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,
419-23 (1908) (justifying Oregon’s discrimination against women, the Court
explained that “The two sexes differ . . . the self-reliance which enables one to
assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence.”);
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 140-42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring)
(explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment did not afford protections to women
for the purposes of employment of engaging in a profession, justifying his
position by stating that “The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life. . . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother.”) Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture,
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto
ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1372 (2006).
15
See generally Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)(although the Court utilized
the standard of review in traditional rational basis terms, the Court determined
that an Idaho state law was invalid on its face based on the concept of sex
discrimination).
16
See Mike Brigner, Why Do Judges Do That?, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE,
AND CHILD CUSTODY 13-5 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010);
King, supra note 5 at 154.
17
See, e.g., Amy Kaiser, Carol Strike, & Lorraine E. Ferris, What the Courts
Need to Know About Mental Health Diagnoses of Abused Women, 19 MED. & L.
737, 741 (2000); Donna J. King, Naming the Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé of an
Abuser's Successful Use of a Judicial Proceeding for Continued Domestic
Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153, 157-58 (2012). See
generally EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN
PERSONAL LIFE (2007).
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experienced its own difficulties in finding a consensus for one
holistic working definition for trauma. 18 Indeed, the trauma
experienced by DV victims is not monolithic in nature; it manifests
itself in many forms of suffering often compared to that of
kidnapped persons or prisoners of war.19 The Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration’s (“SAMHSA”) developed
a concept of trauma for use by caretakers throughout the system
who provide the support to those affected by trauma as well as the
communities and stakeholders working to provide a framework of
trauma-informed support.20
The most important avenue of protection and for assistance
for DV victims is through the U.S. judicial system. However, many
DV victims frequently find themselves re-victimized by their
abusers through the court system as well as by the active
participation of judges, lawyers, and other officers of the court.21 In
fact, even after an injunction for protection against DV is issued by
the court to prevent the abuser from having direct physical contact
with the victim, the parties to the litigation may often face each other
in open court for a myriad of varying legal reasons. 22 In effect,
because of absolute privilege and gender bias courts, the courthouse
is a shelter for DV offenders who enter its doors with intentions of
18

See David Hirschel & Eve Buzawa, Understanding the Context of Dual Arrest
with Directions for Future Research, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1449, 145658 (2002); Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration,
SAMHSA’s Concept of Trauma and Guidance for a Trauma-Informed Approach,
7 (July 2014), http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content//SMA14-4884/SMA144884.pdf.
19
See JON G. ALLEN, COPING WITH TRAUMA: HOPE THROUGH UNDERSTANDING
4 (2nd ed. 2005); STARK, supra note 17, at 204; King supra note 5, at 156.
20
See Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, SAMHSA’s
Concept of Trauma and Guidance for a Trauma-Informed Approach, 7 (July
2014), http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content//SMA14-4884/SMA14-4884.pdf.
21
See Mike Brigner, Why Do Judges Do That?, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE,
AND CHILD CUSTODY 13-5 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010);
King, supra note 5, at 153-54.
22
See Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological
and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1310, 1313 (1993).
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re-abusing their victims.23 Thus, the DV victim is prevented from
holding her abuser liable for any untrue, excessive, or traumatic
statements committed in relation to litigation.24
When a person is disabled and qualifies for protection under
the Americans with Disabilities (“ADA”), it may require the court
to make certain modifications to meet accommodations for disabled
persons, including a DV victim who has been diagnosed with PTSD
as the result of the abuse she has suffered.25 This article asserts that
the absolute privilege is one court rule that should be modified
under the ADA when a DV victim is engaged in litigation with her
abuser.26 The ADA is a powerful federal statute that instructs states
and their courts to accommodate or modify their judicial forums for
the purposes of preventing ongoing discrimination against disabled
persons, which includes DV victims with PTSD.27 Although much
has been done to hold offenders of sexual harassment accountable,
today, there are negligible applicable ADA policies in the DV
context and fewer scholars calling for substantive change to ADA
modifications and accommodations for DV victims with PTSD.28

23

See Brigner, supra note 16, at 13-4 to -5.
See Casey L. Jernigan, The Absolute Privilege is Not a License to Defame, 23
J. LEGAL PROF. 359, 360, 362 (1999). See also King supra note 5, at 169 n.106
(explaining that a DV survivor is revictimized “when her abuser places her ‘on
trial’. . . . [T]he Fathers’ Rights movement actively encourages it’s [sic] members
to smear the credibility of the victim both on the stand and in the community”
(Janet Normalvanbreucher, Stalking Through the Courts, THE LIZ LIBRARY
(1999),
http://www.thelizlibrary.org/site-index/site-indexframe.html#soulhttp://www.thelizlibrary.org/liz/FRtactic.html)).
25
See Keri K. Gould, And Equal Participation for All… The Americans with
Disabilities Act in the Courtroom, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 123, 125, 130, 133, 137-38
(1994).
26
Gould, supra note 25, at 125, 130, 133, 137-38.
27
Gould, supra note 25, at 125, 130, 133, 137-38.
28
United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Information and
Technical Assistance on the Americans with Disabilities Act, (Oct. 2016),
https://www.ada.gov/; LENORE E. A. WALKER, ABUSED WOMEN AND SURVIVOR
THERAPY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST 127-59 (1994)
(explaining the policy changes regarding sexual harassment and the ADA as well
as strengthening therapy for those sexual harassment victims suffering from
PTSD).
24
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Furthermore, while piecemeal accommodations may be occurring,
there is a gap in the scholarship linking DV and absolute privilege.29
The purpose of this article is to explore the U.S. civil court
system and to expose the debilitating trauma that DV victims
experience within the judicial system when having to face their
abuser, particularly the trauma caused by absolute privilege, and to
suggest an avenue for redress. Part II explains the gendered nature
of law and the difficulties victims of DV face when entering the
U.S. legal system. Part III discusses domestic violence, trauma, and
PTSD, specifically focusing on issues pertaining to questioning the
credibility of female witnesses. Part IV describes the difficulty
victims of DV experience when leaving their abuser and provides
specific details as to the trauma and injuries caused by DV,
especially that of PTSD. Part V explains the DV abuser’s ability to
manipulate the gender-biased court system and describes how the
DV victim is re-traumatized during contentious litigation with their
abuser. Part VI presents the common law doctrine of absolute
privilege as a weapon for furthering DV within a judicial
proceeding. Part VII asserts that the ADA mandates that the U.S.
judicial system has an obligation to modify its policies, specifically
as to the affirmative defense of absolute privilege, to accommodate
DV victims with PTSD in litigation whereby the victim’s disability
prevents the proper administration of justice.
II.

THE GENDERED NATURE OF LAW: THE MEN’S
TRIBUNAL
“The backlash against gender-sensitive responses to
women’s victimization, offending, and imprisonment is
inseparable from the broader context of contemporary
resistance to and reaction against feminism
and other movements for civil and human rights.”30

29

See Gould, supra note 25, at 125, 130, 133, 137-38.
Molly Dragiewicz, Patriarchy Reasserted: Fathers’ Rights and Anti-VAWA
Activism, 3 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 121, 121 (2008).
30
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By its very construct, the law, as a discourse and a practice,
is traditional and conservative, making it very ridged to new
concepts, radical thinking, and change. 31 Through the process of
legal precedent, legal language tends to rely on antiquated
terminology that is grounded in masculine legal thought and
processes that reflect patriarchal social norms.32 Indeed, the term
man is considered the genderless norm upon which all other forms
of identity, including gender and race, must rely.33 However, the
notion that the law is genderless, with men representing the nongender perspective, is not reflective of the gender-biased reality
most women face on a day-to-day basis throughout the U.S. judicial
system.34 In the law, the use of the term gender is meant to signify
the social and cultural construct of women rather than men for which
legal jurisprudence, regarding sex or gender discrimination,
identifies as feminine rather than masculine characteristics.35
Since the U.S. Constitution came into force in 1789, U.S.
state and federal judiciaries have consistently protected and
reinforced a male-gendered legal position.36 The U.S. legal system
is entrenched in male concepts and female stereotypes, causing the
male experience to be viewed as the only legitimate foundational
31

See Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of
the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 888-90
(1989).
32
Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the
Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 890 (1989);
See Molly Dragiewicz, Patriarchy Reasserted: Fathers’ Rights and Anti-VAWA
Activism, 3 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 121, 123 (2008).
33
See Finley, supra note 31 at 887-88.
34
See, e.g., Brigner, supra note 16, at 13-3 to -8; See also Erika R. Schwarz,
When “Neutral” Doesn’t Really Mean “Neutral”: Louisiana’s Child Custody
Laws—An Attempt to Erase Gender Bias in the Name of Neutrality, 42 LOY. L.
REV. 365, 365 (1997).
35
See Molly Dragiewicz, Patriarchy Reasserted: Fathers’ Rights and AntiVAWA Activism, 3 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 121, 122 (2008); Lucinda M. Finley,
Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of
Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 887-88, 890 (1989).
36
See Erika R. Schwarz, When “Neutral” Doesn’t Really Mean “Neutral”:
Louisiana’s Child Custody Laws—An Attempt to Erase Gender Bias in the Name
of Neutrality, 42 LOY. L. REV. 365, 372 (1997).
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standard upon which legal rights and claims are be based.37 This
gendered legal perspective creates a fertile breeding ground for
male-dominated legal decisions, especially in family court where
DV cases are heard.38 Indeed, the voice of the female DV victim is
often drowned out by the male-centric legal reasoning and legal
rhetoric of judges who have the discretion to determine that DV has
not occurred or is a thing of the past, even in cases with the most
substantial physical evidence of abuse.39
A. Domestic Violence Dismissiveness: A Case Study
The legal system is inherently male and overtly seeks to
empower the male norm.40 The reasonable person (man) standard
utilized throughout the U.S. judicial system and within societal
norms reflect the male gender standard. 41 Even still, women
experience discrimination in more subtle ways through malegendered power dominance that expects women to assimilate into
the male norm rather than allowing them to maintain the femalegendered differential, especially through unwritten social norms

37

See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1977) (In making its decision,
the court stated that “the gender-based differentiation created by [the statute] that
results in the efforts of female workers required to pay social security taxes
producing less protection for their spouses than is produced by the efforts of men
– is forbidden by the Constitution, at least when supported by no more substantial
justification than ‘archaic and overbroad’ generalizations, . . . or ‘old notions,’ . .
. such as ‘assumptions as to dependency,’ . . . that are more consistent with ‘the
role-typing society has long imposed,’ . . . than with contemporary reality.”);
Erika R. Schwarz, When “Neutral” Doesn’t Really Mean “Neutral”: Louisiana’s
Child Custody Laws—An Attempt to Erase Gender Bias in the Name of
Neutrality, 42 LOY. L. REV. 365, 373 (1997).
38
See, e.g., Brigner, supra note 16, at 13-3 to -8; Schwarz, supra note 36, at 37273.
39
See, e.g., Brigner, supra note 16, at 13-3 to -8.
40
See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN
PERSONAL LIFE 156 (2007); Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of Domination and
the Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism Unmodified, 82 NW. U. L. REV.
352, 355 (1988).
41
See STARK, supra note 17; Finley supra note 31.
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and expectations that pervade legal doctrines. 42 Psychologist
Lenore Walker, who developed the term battered women’s
syndrome (“BWS”), explains that social battering stems from
various forms of coercion implemented by the DV abuser, such as
economic discrimination and social isolation. 43 Indeed, Walker
asserts that PTSD is the most accurate diagnosis for the
psychological symptoms of most abused women who seek
assistance through therapy. However, for those abused women who
do not meet the criteria for such a formal diagnosis, BWS is
understood as another model of explanation for the clinical
symptoms the DV victim suffers. 44 The result of such crossdiagnosis utilized within the psychological community, crossing
over into the judicial system, allows for further confusion and
pervasive bias against the DV victim. Indeed, having to determine
whether to apply BWS or PTSD prior to a trial for the purposed of
a DV case, where the judge is already indignant, does not bode well
for the DV victim. Indeed, throughout the United States and its legal
system, women, especially those who are victims of DV, are treated
with disdain, disbelief and dismissiveness, as the case below
exemplifies.45
Susan Rhoades and Reginald Garcia were married in 1978,
but, following 25 years of violence and sexual assault, Susan finally
summoned the courage to separate from her husband.46 Her divorce
proceedings were highly contested and protracted, and the trial court
found that Susan’s testimony was not correct, including her

42

See STARK, supra note 17 (explaining that men are provided the full dignity of
an adult entitled to a complete set of rights whereby women must prove
themselves worthy of this same treatment); Finley supra note 31.
43
See STARK, supra note 17, at 120.
44
See STARK, supra note 17, at 120; LENORE E. A. WALKER, ABUSED WOMEN
AND SURVIVOR THERAPY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST 36970 (1994).
45
See Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological
and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1309-10 (1993).
46
See Garcia v. Rhoades, 2012 Cal. Unrep. LEXIS 8837, at *4-7 (Cal. Ct. App.
1st Dist. Dec. 3, 2012).
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allegations of DV against her husband.47 Nevertheless, trial court
testimony shows how Susan’s experiences with DV profoundly
affected her struggles in the courtroom.48 Although Susan’s expert
testimony supported her experiences of DV, Susan’s attempts to
protect herself through the judicial system by her requests for
protection from her estranged husband, her DV allegations were
viewed as baseless.49
At trial, Susan testified to receiving threatening phone calls
where she could hear a clip being inserted into a gun and the noise
of a police scanner in the background.50 After living in constant
fear, Susan presented as very distressed, tearful, and anxious at her
first counseling session which were determined to be cluster
symptoms associated with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),
stemming from a traumatic experience in her marriage.51 Still, due
to Garcia’s expert’s testimony at trial, stating that Susan lacked the
required major life-threatening traumatic experience for a PTSD
diagnosis, Susan was found by the trial court to have exaggerated
her experiences with Garcia.52 Although the trial court record in
this case contains substantial evidence of Susan’s struggles with DV
and its effects on her abilities to function, the court did not view the
evidence as such. Rather, it found that Susan was irresponsible,
prolonged the proceedings, and was the cause of the costly
litigation. 53 Thus, the court found that Garcia committed no DV
against Susan.54

47

See Id. at *35.
See Id. at *23-29 (at the end of the day of expert testimony on Susan’s mental
health condition brought on by DV by both Susan’s and Garcia’s experts, the
court admonished both parties that the case was taking too long, needed to be
concluded, or would continue into the next calendar year).
49
See Id. at *43.
50
Id. at *21.
51
Id. at *23.
52
See Garcia v. Rhoades, 2012 Cal. Unrep. LEXIS 8837, at *37 (Cal. Ct. App.
1st Dist. Dec. 3, 2012).
53
See Id. at *43.
54
See Id.
48
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B. Preventing Progress: Bradwell v. Illinois
American society considers maleness the apex or pinnacle
of its gendered hierarchy due to the fact that men dominate public
and private positions of power. 55 However, maleness is also the
foundation, or the bedrock of the American legal system because its
federal and state laws are based upon the male worldview. 56
Femaleness is ignored, devalued, and disregarded with impunity by
the overall gendered structure of American society, which permits
the law and government to perpetuate the United States’ primary
patriarchal atmosphere.57 This atmosphere of women’s inferiority
and male superiority allows DV to perpetuate because violence
against women is not stigmatized.58
Historically, men have maintained the power and ability to
construct a gendered hierarchy that governs and controls societal
structures, including government and the law. 59 This gendered
power continues to support inequality, resulting in the subordination
and domination of women. 60 It is due to these societal gender
inequalities that DV abusers feel empowered to deploy their many
DV tactics upon their victim. 61 Without society’s social stigmas
working against them, abusive men are more enabled to continue
the cycle of abuse through ongoing power and control structures
implemented within the home, structures that continue into the law
and its institutions.62
55

Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman
Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1398, 1411-12 (1992).
56
See Joan Zorza, Batterer Manipulation and Retaliation Compounded by Denial
and Complicity in the Family Courts, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND
CHILD CUSTODY 14-11 to 14-12 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds.,
2010); Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task
Handed to Capital Jurors, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1345, 1348-49 (1994).
57
See Id.
58
See STARK, supra note 17.
59
See Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable
Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1412
(1992).
60
See Id.
61
See STARK, supra note 17.
62
See STARK, supra note 17.
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The patriarchal atmosphere was classically expressed in the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bradwell v. Illinois, which
illustrated its view of female autonomy. 63 With the majority’s
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court used its male-biased
interpretation to indefinitely deny women their unenumerated
fundamental rights. 64 As long as the Court found it necessary to
maintain the patriarchal society it cherished, it circumvented the
intent of the Fourteenth Amendment.65 In his infamous concurring
opinion in Bradwell, Justice Bradley expressed his strongly held
viewpoint regarding women and their status within society. 66 He
stated that Mrs. Bradwell “assume[d]” incorrectly that “women as
citizens” have the right “under the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution … to engage in any and every profession, occupation,
or employment in civil life.”67 Additionally, Justice Bradley stated
that the “natural and proper timidity and delicacy” of women makes
them unfit “for many of the occupations of civil life.” 68 In his
conclusion, Justice Bradley stated that it is “[t]he paramount destiny
and mission of woman [] to fulfill the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother.”69 It is this typical, Court endorsed, stereotype of
women that perpetuates societal, economic, and gender
inequalities.70 Truly, Justice Bradley’s comments, in his concurring
opinion in Bradwell, proclaim the same anti-feminist undertones
that women, especially DV victims, face today.

63

See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 138-39; Donna J. King, The War on Women’s
Fundamental Rights: Connecting U.S. Supreme Court Originalism to Rightwing,
Conservative Extremism in American Politics, 19 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 99,
99 (2012).
65
See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 138-39; King, supra note 64, at 123-24.
66
See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 140-42.
67
Id. at 140.
68
Id. at 141.
69
Id.
70
See STARK, supra note 17.
64
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C. Equality and Feminism
The decision and sexist rhetoric within the opinion from
Bradwell v. Illinois set an overtly damaging precedent for
“legitimiz[ing] sex discriminat[ion] attitudes and behavior” for well
over a century. 71 The holding in Bradwell, as well as the legal
analysis employed by the Court, reinforced the concept that “gender
determines one’s appropriate social role.” 72 By legitimizing and
perpetuating sex discrimination, the Supreme Court maintained and
fortified the “diminishment of women’s power in society.”73 This
legal behavior further fuels the oppression and subjugation of
women within American society, helping to foster the nation’s
ignorance of and detachment from the issues surrounding the
perpetration of DV and the many harms it invokes upon its
victims. 74 Today, these decisions continue to affect women’s
ability, or lack thereof, to obtain the equal protection of the laws to
which they are entitled.75
The adversarial system, from which our American judicial
system is based, uses metaphors that parallel individualistic and
conflict-oriented constructs that portray a system that was “created
for people for whom conflict is natural or even desirable.”76 Legal
language, and the use of metaphors in legal language, can alienate
women and hinder their participation in legal dialogue. 77 The
framers and users of legal language, i.e. white, educated, privileged
men, drafted the narrative of the law and the traditional nature of
metaphors used in legal language so that the law emphasizes
“masculine ‘patterns of socialization, experience, and values.’” 78
Feminists lament that the use of baseball metaphors, for example,
71

Wildman, supra note 9, at 266.
Wildman, supra note 9.
73
Wildman, supra note 9.
74
See STARK, supra note 17.
75
See, e.g., Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 9, at 56-57; King, supra note 5.
76
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports, and
Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 225, 251 (1995).
77
Adam Arms, Metaphor, Women and Law, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 257,
273 (1999).
78
Arms, supra note 77, at 274.
72
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and other sporting rhetoric in legal language represent the very
essence of patriarchal oppression. 79 At present, male and sports
metaphors used in legal language “do not reflect the presence of
women in litigation.” 80 The use of sexual metaphors in legal
language to emphasize the dominance of the legal system by
heterosexual male sexuality is more subtle than sports and war
metaphors, but it also emphasizes that the realm of litigation is
occupied predominantly by men.81 Moreover, if women are unable
or unwilling to assume male traits in the “specific metaphorical
structuring of litigation,” women risk devaluation and a relegation
to perceived non-entities in the legal realm as well as complete
exclusion from legal dialog. 82 Still, the law is not simply a
dichotomous interpretation of unambiguous words. The “nature of
legal reasoning” is predominantly “male defined,” leaving it open
to gender-biased interpretation, rather than objective legal
reasoning.83
Some feminist legal theorists, including Angela P. Harris,
suggest that the U.S. gendered hierarchical system does not afford
women full economic, social, or legal status. 84 When explaining
dominance feminism, Harris describes a gendered system that
converges with the institutional structures and economic practices
of American society, essentially threatening women’s individuality
and vulnerabilities. Indeed, it is foremost women’s autonomy and
agency that DV abusers understand they must control.85 However,
the theoretical model of dominance feminism does not argue for
gender equality. Rather, it advocates abolishing the existing systems
which are founded on the concept of woman-hating.86 It is these
79

Arms, supra note 77, at 274.
Thornburg, supra note 76, at 246.
81
Arms, supra note 77, at 275
82
Arms, supra note 77, at 276.
83
See Finley, supra note 31, at 886.
84
See Angela P. Harris, Theorizing Class, Gender, and the Law: Three
Approaches, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 51 (2009).
85
See Harris, supra note 84, at 51-52; STARK, supra note 17.
86
See Harris, supra note 84, at 51.
80
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systems that reinforce structural misogynistic attributes within
American society, making it extraordinarily difficult for the female
DV victim to find a voice.87 Indeed, these theorists assert that the
male perspective is the dominant measurement and viewpoint, or
norm, from which all other legal perspectives are developed. 88
Harris asserts that the misogynist norm should not be the equality
standard to which women aspire. Rather women, as well as society
as a whole, should seek to remove this male legal standard because
it creates a barrier for all other protected groups of people.89 As a
result, despite the legal losses that women like Mrs. Bradwell and
Susan Garcia experience, they must continue to seek equality
through the legal protections provided by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 90 Although the Supreme Court attempts to overtly
deny women their enumerated and unenumerated fundamental
rights, by determining through the most sexist means that the
Amendment does not apply to them, it is important that the charge
for full access to rights and liberties is not abandoned.91
III.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TRAUMA, AND POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: QUESTIONING
THE CREDIBILITY OF THE FEMALE WITNESS

“[W]omen are often disbelieved because they are women.”92
87

See Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of
the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 888, 892
(1989).
88
See Harris, supra note 84, at 51.
89
See Harris, supra note 84, at 51.
90
See King, supra note 64, at 125-26.
91
See Joan Hoff Wilson, The Legal Status of Women in the Late Nineteenth and
Early Twentieth Centuries, 6 HUM. RTS. 125, 126 (1977); Donna J. King, Naming
the Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé of an Abuser's Successful Use of a Judicial
Proceeding for Continued Domestic Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC.
JUST. 153, 161 n.53 (2012) (discussing Justice Scalia’s comments and others’
viewpoints that women are not protected under the Fourteenth Amendment);
King, supra note 64, at § IV.
92
Molly Dragiewicz, Gender Bias in the Courts: Implications for Battered
Mothers and Their Children, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD
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Men’s systemic discrimination against women finds no
better historical example than the legal doctrine of coverture. 93
Upon marriage, the husband and wife were considered “one person
in law.” 94 Adopted from the common law in England, coverture
considered married women covered under the legal protection of
their husbands.95 Once a woman married, coverture severely limited
her rights to own and control property, including her pre-marital and
post-marital property, as it immediately transferred to the sole
control of her husband. 96 Through the simple act of marriage, a
woman was legally subsumed by her husband, making her “civilly
dead.”97 As coverture lost its foothold and women became stronger
legally due to the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, divorce
law evolved concurrently with the changing roles of women
throughout American society. 98 A basic strain within family
relationships, fueling to an ever climbing contemporary divorce
rate, is women’s determination to achieve greater autonomy and
recognition as an equal partner within the marriage and family.99
Indeed, divorce was an escape for those whose spouses failed to

CUSTODY 5-9 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010) (quoting Judith
Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2205
(1993)).
93
Danaya C. Wright, Untying the Knot: An Analysis of the English Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes Court Records, 1858-1866, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 903, 903
n.1 (2004)(“Coverture is a legal doctrine in which a woman’s legal existence is
subsumed into that of her husband upon marriage. While in a state of coverture—
so long as she remains married—she is unable to own property, control her own
wages, enter into contracts, make her own will, or be sued.”)
94
See Zaher, supra note 9, at 460.
95
See Zaher, supra note 9, at 460 (emphasis added).
96
See Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
383, 385 (1994).
97
See Zaher, supra note 9, at 460.
98
Steven Mintz, Children, Families and the State: American Family Law in
Historical Perspective, 69 DENV. U. L. REV. 635, 647 (1992); See U.S. CONꜱ T.
amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX
99
Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical
Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 657 (1984).
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achieve the higher expectations of this demanding marital
dynamic.100
Domestic Violence has garnered an ever increasing
awareness in America in recent decades. However, the issue of DV
is documented throughout history dating back to Ancient Rome.101
As late as the 1870s in America, husbands and fathers exercising
their property rights were legally allowed to chastise their wives and
children, including the use of the rule of thumb.102 Today, although
the practice of physical chastisement is illegal, society has
repeatedly turned a blind eye toward dealing with DV and family
matters in general, resisting interference within the nuclear family
unit because of our long-standing concern with maintaining
domestic privacy.103
The social science term domestic violence, defined by
Mary Ann Dutton, is:
a pattern of coercive behavior that changes the
dynamics of an intimate relationship within which it
occurs. Once the pattern of coercive control is
established, both parties understand differently the
meaning of specific actions and words. Domestic
violence is not simply a list of discrete behaviors, but
is a pattern of behavior exhibited by the batterer that
includes words, actions, and gestures, which, taken
together, establish power and control over an
intimate partner.104

100

See Friedman, supra note 99, at 658.
See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 148.
102
See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 148; Williams, supra note 96, at 386 (a
husband could chastise his wife with a stick as long as it was no larger in diameter
than that of his thumb).
103
See Ver Steegh, supra note 8.
104
Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 151 (quoting Mary Ann Dutton, Expert Witness
Testimony in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE,
ABA COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE § 8-81, § 8-8 (Deborah M. Goelman
et al. eds., 1996)).
101
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Dutton’s definition indicates that DV is part of a larger dynamic
whereby an abuser uses violence to reinforce domination strategies
over his victim. 105 However, definitions of DV utilized in the
practice of law are different from social science definitions.106 The
law is primarily focused on specific, discrete incident(s) of physical
abuse, rather than the broader spectrum of abusive conduct that
encompasses “a cohesive pattern of coercive controls,” which is
understood to occur by the social science definition. 107 The term
domestic violence, whether used in the broader social science or
narrower legal context, is often too truncated to properly describe
an individual’s DV experience. 108 A more individual, abstract
concept is needed to address the unique experiences of the DV
victim due to the shortcomings of the one-size-fits-all prevailing
view of DV.109
Abused women may experience a wide variety of near-term
and long-term impacts from physical, sexual, and emotional DV.110
Specifically, women can suffer from “clinical depression and
somatic complaints, anxiety disorders, mental illness, alcohol and
drug abuse, low self-esteem, and suicidal ideation.” 111 DV
manifests as the use of power and control by an abuser, who is
typically male, against an intimate partner, who is typically
female.112 The use of power and control by an abuser can take many
forms.113 Physical violence is used in select circumstances and in
strategic, calculated ways. 114 The abuser may seem irrational or
105

See Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 985 (1994-1995).
106
See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 151.
107
Linda E. Offner, Power and Control: Dispelling the Myths Surrounding
Domestic Violence, 13 NEV. FAM. L. REP., Winter Extra 6, 6 (1998); accord Ver
Steegh, supra note 8, at 151.
108
Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 152.
109
See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 151.
110
See Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 740.
111
See Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 740.
112
See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 15-16; STARK, supra note 17, at 281.
113
See STARK, supra note 17, at 269-276; Stark, supra note 105, at 983-84.
114
See Stark, supra note 105, at 986.
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unpredictable in order to maintain a sense of insecurity and fear in
his victim. 115 Verbal, emotional, and economic threats are other
tactics employed by many DV abusers.116 However, many abused
women, especially those who do not experience physical violence
from their abuser, may not even realize they are victims of DV.117
Thus, they do not self-identify as a victim or seek outside assistance
to remedy their situation. 118 As a result, millions of women are
unwittingly subjected to ongoing DV every day, living under the
torment and control of their abusers.119
On June 26, 1987, the United Nations Human Rights Office
of the High Commissioner entered into force its Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.120 The Convention against Torture defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing
him for an act her or a third person has committed or
is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity. It does
not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.121
115

See STARK, supra note 17, at 281.
See King, supra note 5, at 156.
117
See, e.g., King, supra note 5; STARK, supra note 17, at 157-158.
118
See King, supra note 5, at 154-55, 157.
119
See King, supra note 5, at 154-55, 157.
120
See generally Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cat.pdf
[hereinafter
Convention against Torture].
121
Convention against Torture, supra note 273, at art. I, ¶ 1 (Dec. 10, 1984),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cat.pdf.
116
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Indeed, this comprehensive definition, ascribed to the United
Nations, encompasses the forms of torture tolerated by the U.S.
judicial system as discussed in this article. DV, whether
implemented through physical violence or through non-physical
forms of abuse, is a form of torture that continues against its victim,
is ongoing, and extends over a period of time. 122 The torture
experienced by DV victims, especially through the US judicial
system, the trauma these victims manifest, and the symptomology
they evidence helps to explain the correlation between gender bias
in the U.S. judicial system and DV. 123 The prevalence of PTSD
among DV victims, who must interact within the U.S. judicial
system, is alarming, especially considering the ones who are not
properly diagnosed, treated, or accommodated.124
With torture, comes trauma. Trauma is the reaction by a
person to an event or series of events that are shocking to the person
and are emotionally and psychologically injurious. 125 When one
experiences a horrible event, they experience trauma.126 Trauma is
“a violently produced wound [that has] an emotional shock with a
lasting effect.”127 Exposure to a traumatic event, such as violence
and abuse, alters the way a DV victim views herself, her friends and
family, and her environment.128 DV victims who experience trauma
may develop hyper-vigilance in reaction to perceptions of their
vulnerability or lack of safety. Victims may experience a sense that
the violence and abuse from their partner will reoccur or intensify.
122

See King, supra note 5, at 157-58.
See King, supra note 5, at 153-54.
124
See Meier, supra note 22, at 1312-14.
125
See JON G. ALLEN, COPING WITH TRAUMA: HOPE THROUGH UNDERSTANDING
5-16 (2nd ed. 2005).
126
Anne E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases:
Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 567, 605 (2003).
127
See ALLEN, supra note 19.
128
See Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic
Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1191, 1218 (1993).
123
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Often, batterers employ a steady barrage of psychological abuse
between episodes of violence, including; “coercion and threats;
intimidation; emotional abuse; isolation; minimization, denial, and
blaming; use of the children to control the victim; use of ‘male
privilege;’ and economic/resource abuse[; and stalking] may
incorporate several of these categories of psychological abuse.”129
SAMHSA’s concept of trauma is explained as “[i]ndividual
trauma result[ing] from an event, series of events, or set of
circumstances that is experienced by an individual as physically or
emotionally harmful or life threatening and that has lasting adverse
effects on the individual’s functioning and mental, physical, social,
emotional, or spiritual well-being.” 130 This concept of trauma is
instructive for a court of law in regards to DV victims who have to
face their abusers in open court. 131 In many cases, the trauma
experienced by DV victims harms them both physically and
mentally, even when no physical abuse has occurred or is evident.132
Nevertheless, most DV definitions focus on physical abuse as the
standard bearer for the court to be able to issue an order for
protection against an abuser.133 As Webster’s Dictionary suggests,
such traumatizing DV often “causes psychological pain or
discomfort and may be very disabling . . . includ[ing manifestations
of] anxiety, compulsions, phobias, and depression” as well as
psychological injuries such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD).134
PTSD has been included in both the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (“DSM”) and the
International Classification of Diseases. 135 The DSM-IV, dated
129

Id. at 1206.
See Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration,
SAMHSA’s Concept of Trauma and Guidance for a Trauma-Informed Approach,
7 (July 2014), http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content//SMA14-4884/SMA144884.pdf.
131
See id.
132
See, e.g., STARK, supra note 17; King, supra note 5.
133
See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 151-52.
134
See WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 969 (edition year);
accord Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17.
135
See Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 741.
130
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1994, states that PTSD can occur when: “(1) the person experienced
an event that involved actual or threatened death or a threat to the
physical integrity of self and; (2) the person’s response involved
intense fear, helplessness or horror.” 136 However, the DSM-5
differs significantly from the DSM-IV in its recognition and
description of major symptoms and diagnostic criteria of and for
PTSD. 137 For example, the DSM-IV states that PTSD is “a
condition that may ensue when a person has been exposed to a
traumatic event.”138 But, the DSM-5 “is more explicit with regard
to how an individual experienced ‘traumatic’ events.” 139 Indeed,
exposure to DV is certainly a traumatic event, causing between 33%
and 62% of DV victims to be diagnosed with PTSD.140
DV cannot simply be boxed into isolated, singular events of
physical violence. 141 The trauma endured during the daily life
course of an abused woman can be more damaging and difficult to
recover from than the worst forms of physical violence. 142 It is
because of this type of invisible torment that many women feel “a
formal psychiatric diagnosis of PTSD validates [their] claim of
136

Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 741-42; accord Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-IV, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, https://justines2010blog.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/dsm-iv.pdf.
137
See Highlights of Changes from DSM-IV-TR to DSM-5, AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%2520Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA
_DSM_Changes_from_DSM-IV-TR_-to_DSM5.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.; see Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders, DSM-5, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
https://psicovalero.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/dsm-v-ingles-manualdiagnc3b3stico-y-estadc3adstico-de-los-trastornos-mentales.pdf.
138
Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 741.
139
See Highlights of Changes from DSM-IV-TR to DSM-5, AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%2520Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA
_DSM_Changes_from_DSM-IV-TR_-to_DSM5.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
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exposure to severe trauma.”143 The continuous levels of stress and
fear, as well as feelings of disempowerment and lack of control
evoked by their abuser, is comparable to the torture experienced by
prisoners of war.144 The trauma from DV experienced by victims,
which can ultimately lead to PTSD, is part of a much “larger pattern
of dominance and control,” beyond merely the physical
aggression.145
A DV victim with PTSD “may experience delusions or
hallucinations, high levels of distractibility, decreased personal
hygiene, social isolation or withdrawal, strange behavior,
confusion, anxiety, poor insight and judgement, and impaired
interpersonal relations.”146 Due to her PTSD injury, she may have
challenges with “maintaining stamina, managing time pressure,
focusing on multiple tasks, or responding to negative comments.”147
Additionally, a DV victim with PTSD may be receiving treatment
for her condition with psychotropic medications, which are intended
to provide beneficial changes to her cognitive function. These
medications, however, can have some negative side effects. 148
These side effects can include: “acute dystonia (severe involuntary
spasms of the upper body, tongue, throat, or eyes), akathisia (motor
restlessness and inability to sit still) . . . and tardive dyskinesia (a
generally irreversible neurological disorder characterized by
involuntary uncontrollable muscular movements often in the facial
area).” 149 A DV victim with PTSD who displays these negative
effects from her medication can affect the perceptions formed by a
judge or jury related to her competence or even sanity.150 Litigants
with psychiatric disabilities, like PTSD, “are significantly less
likely than their counterparts with non-psychiatric disabilities to
143
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receive a beneficial outcome.” 151 People with PTSD were
“significantly less likely than people with other disabilities to feel
that they had a chance to tell their stories, that they were treated with
dignity, or that decisionmakers were fair.”152
Women, who may be trapped in a “cycle of violence,” can
develop PTSD from emotional, sexual, and/or physical abuse. 153
Studies show that a diagnosis of PTSD for an abused woman
suggests that the disorder is the “causative effect of the abuse.”154
Although PTSD was initially used to explain the impact on war
veterans who were exposed to traumatic events in combat,
symptoms associated with PTSD in veterans have also been found
to be common among women who are victims of DV.155 Women
who are victims of DV may experience a “state of siege,” whereby
the abuser continues to batter the victim with psychological abuse
during times of non-physical violence episodes, while the victim
lives with the varying levels of psychological abuse not knowing
when the next incident of physical violence will occur.156 They may
experience a sense of low self-esteem and even blame themselves
for the violence and abuse as a result of trauma. DV victims may
find trusting others difficult or impossible due to the traumatic
experience of verbal and physical violence.157 Victims of DV who
experience trauma may also struggle with reoccurring central
nervous system issues whose symptoms include headaches, back
pain, fainting, or seizures.158 DV victims may also show symptoms,
signs, and disorders associated with chronic fear and stress like
gastrointestinal disorders, appetite loss, viral infections, and cardiac
151
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issues including hypertension and chest pain. 159 Finally, it is
important to remember that not all victims of DV or trauma cross
the threshold for a PTSD diagnosis. However, the absence of a
PTSD diagnosis should never be considered as evidence that DV is
not present in an intimate relationship.160
IV.

CHALLENGES TO LEAVING THE ABUSER:
PATRIARCHAL BARRIERS

The barriers to resources that assist DV victims in leaving
their abuser can be social, psychological, and legal. 161 Although
difficult, DV victims may sometimes be able to escape their abusers
through, among other options, assistance from mental health
counselors, victim advocates, religious leaders, and interventions
from family and friends.162 Support systems are a crucial element to
a DV victim’s successful separation from DV abusers. 163 DV
abusers often target a victim’s core support factors, such as “food,
money, friendships, personal appearance, relationships with
children, [and] extended family.” 164 Without core support, DV
victims become dependent on the abuser for basic needs. DV
abusers also benefit from structural inequalities within our society.
Inadequate or incompetent social sources of assistance help to
strengthen the DV abuser’s control over his victim. When police fail
to arrest the abuser, when medical physicians fail to inquire about
abuse, and when child protective services remove the child from the
mother instead of providing assistance with helping the mother keep
her and the child safe, the failure to intervene by sources of public
assistance help strengthen the DV abuser’s power and control over
his victim.165
159
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A. The DV Victim: Barriers in the Court System
DV victims and their abusers often end up tangled in the
civil (and criminal) legal system(s).166 Legal matters involving DV
victims seeking relief – including injunctions, petitions for orders
for protection, and divorce – can accelerate violence during and
following court actions.167 But even as DV victims look to legal
institutions for help, they often find themselves mired in a system
that reinforces the power imbalance they faced throughout their
abusive intimate partner relationship.168 DV abusers often use the
judicial process to continue to abuse their victims.169 DV abusers
can employ a variety of successful maneuvers in court in which the
abuser
project[s] a non-abusive image, using new partners
as character references, using the [DV victim’s]
anger or mistrust to discredit her, making false or
exaggerated defensive accusations against the [DV
victim], presenting themselves as the parties who are
willing to communicate, . . . “it is common for
[abusers] to be skillfully dishonest.”170
Even if a civil judge admits that DV occurred, many times they will
focus on a specific incident of physical violence, trivialize the
severity of the abuse and, often, ignore the emotional and economic
effects placed upon the DV victim which can be more profound,
severe, and extensive than the DV itself.171 Adding to the pressure
DV victims face in court, those who are in divorce proceedings are
“routinely denied protection [from domestic violence] on the
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suspicion that their requests for protection are manipulative
tactics.”172
The impact on women who endure DV should be of
significance to a court of law. 173 PTSD, BWS, and other
psychological disorders have been used effectively to legitimize the
impact of abuse on women, but, they are also used to undermine the
DV victim’s credibility in court, especially when there is no
confirmed diagnosis.174 Women, who suffer from PTSD, can have
symptoms from their disorder that negatively impact them in
litigation situations. 175 PTSD can have a subtle presentation in
victims, which may lead to a lack of consistent rulings from
courts.176 PTSD often causes victims to react with “hyperarousal,”
in which they feel irritable and on guard; “intrusion,” in which they
re-experience painful memories; and “constriction,” in which they
feel a diminished ability to experience emotion or whereby they
experience a feeling of detachment from a given situation.177 Thus,
having to testify in court in judicial proceedings related to their
abuser exacerbates these symptoms, causing the DV victim to reexperience the trauma that caused the PTSD or causing the DV
victim to completely dissociate during a hearing or trial to protect
herself from the reoccurrence of the trauma that triggers the
PTSD.178
B. The DV Victim: PTSD as a Stigma
The DV victim’s potential reactions in litigation settings as
discussed above may cause a court to question “the woman’s
demeanor and interaction with people and events, and thereby affect
her credibility.” 179 Manifestations of PTSD may appear as
172
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“‘dissociation’” in which a DV victim dissociates herself from her
body in order to protect herself from the onslaught of triggering
events that cause the original trauma that caused the PTSD to
emerge. When dissociation occurs, the DV victim becomes numb
and may appear “plastic” or “fake” when describing her abuse,
exhibiting a preoccupied demeanor that a judge or jury would not
expect. 180 She may experience “hyperarousal” and become
extremely excited in reaction to a minor event like an insult or a
look from her abuser in court. 181 The presence of DV can
profoundly alter how a DV victim fares in court. 182 When these
diagnoses are utilized properly in an effort to explain the victim’s
seemingly irrational behavior, whether in or out of court, a woman,
who would otherwise seem non-credible, instead, has an advocate
who is able to advance her DV experience and injuries.183 But, when
they are not utilized appropriately or DV victims do not have
adequate legal counsel, the result can be dramatically unfair.184
DV abusers can wreak psychological and legal havoc during
and following divorce proceedings.185 Abusers can use the judicial
process as a way to continue the verbal and economic abuse of their
victims to maintain their power and control over her.186 Judges in
family court matters typically must attempt to sift through the facts
presented through a distorted lens of contentious and, often, very
complex adversarial litigation.187 Some of these adversarial cases
involve intense conflicts regarding the custody of the children
180
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where it is necessary for the court to determine the best interests of
the child in a family where DV is present.188 In custody matters,
victims who suffer from PTSD will most likely have their
psychological injuries from DV used against them by lawyers,
expert witnesses, and judges because of the legal system’s myopic
bias against women’s autonomy and reliability.189
Courts have used symptomology stemming from PTSD as a
catalyst to find that a mother is unfit as a parent, subsequently
awarding custody to the abuser.190 Although relatively rare, some
courts have awarded custody to “fathers who killed the childrens’
[sic] mother, on the ground that the violence against the childrens’
[sic] mother was not directed toward the children and did not
indicate the father would be a poor parent.”191 As repugnant to legal
fairness as this extreme example may seem, it is an indication of the
dismissive attitude courts often reveal toward DV victims and the
actions of their abusers.192 It is very common for courts to hold the
abuse of the children by the abuser against the protective parent
where neglect or abuse are at issue, especially in cases where the
protective parent is a victim of abuse by the abuser as well.193 It is
widely recognized that children are harmed by witnessing the abuse
of a parent by the other parent.194 However, evidence of the children
witnessing the abuse will often be held against the mother for
exposing the children to the violence, including possible criminal
sanctions and even termination of parental rights.195
Even more so than women generally, DV victims enter the
adversarial court system at a clear disadvantage.196 The foundation
188
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of fairness that makes up the American adversarial court system is
primarily based upon a concept that the parties will enter the court
with professional representation (attorneys) and that the finder of
fact (the judge) will determine the truth through a process whereby
relevant information will be brought forth through the attorneys’
best efforts to bring forward their clients’ best positions, therefore
leading ultimately to a just and fair decision from the court. 197
However, in order to realize this ideal, the American adversarial
court system presumes that the parties to the litigation will have an
equal balance of economic resources and access to competent legal
representation. 198 This balance is rarely, if ever, achieved,
especially in cases involving DV in which the abusers will often
“use the court system as a forum to harass and intimidate the abuse
survivor by engaging in traumatic and expensive ongoing
litigation.”199 Without an economic equal balance, the adversarial
model is ill-equipped to compensate for any imbalance of power or
resources.200
Family courts encourage negotiation and will order
mediation in an effort to lead to private settlements. It is, however,
dangerous for DV victims to mediate with their abusers. 201
Avoiding public judicial proceedings to adjudicate issues between
intimate partners is a high priority for practical and ideological
rationales; yet, courts do not understand the inequity of power
between a DV victim and her abuser. 202 This powerful antilitigation bias is motivated from historical ideals about family
autonomy and privacy, and places the DV victim in a vulnerable
position and at a disadvantage, where she will be unable to negotiate
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for her and her children’s best interests.203 Litigants, who reject the
anti-litigation bias and choose to litigate, risk being labeled as
foolhardy, unreasonable, or mentally unstable.204 The litigants who
receive such labels may be determined as such through the lens of
gender bias as well as anti-litigation bias when, in fact, the litigant
is clearly asserting her legal right to fight for her liberty, children’s
safety, and property.205
C. PTSD and DV: A Barrier to Leaving the DV
Abuser
There are many reasons a DV victim might decide to leave
her abuser, but there are also many reasons she may be forced to
stay, especially when a diagnosis of PTSD for the DV victim is
involved. 206 The adversarial litigation model lacks a capacity to
properly recognize the emotional and psychological issues between
the DV victim and her abuser, placing too much emphasis on the
role of the civil court judge who is typically inadequately trained in
these areas. 207 Under the adversarial model, litigants and their
attorneys prepare for an impending trial even though a majority of
dissolution matters are settled.208 Trial preparation places the parties
at odds with each other and places them into a win-lose mentality,
creating differences that are accentuated and common interests,
which are minimized.209 Attorneys are primarily pressed into roles
as advocates rather than problem solvers. 210 Consequently, the
marital dissolution process becomes unnecessarily hostile and
203
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confrontational.211 All these drawbacks to the adversarial model in
family law matters involving DV have “the potential to exacerbate
[an] already dangerous conflict.”212
DV victims have other hurdles to jump over within a court
process. Even if adequate representation is secured, DV victims
must provide assistance with evidence.213 They must also balance
pressures to face “humiliating events that they previously tried to
keep private.”214 The court setting can be a contentious arena for
DV victims who suffer from PTSD. In many circumstances, victims
will be subjected to intimidating cross-examination and may also
experience hostile reactions from judges in the course of
hearings.215 Even if judges acknowledge that DV has taken place,
all too often they devalue the significance of the violence and ignore
the controlling behavior of the abuser when deciding disputes and
crafting orders. 216 Also, they often erroneously assume that,
because the parties are in court, the victim has completely escaped
the abuse.217
DV victims who are suffering from PTSD, find it especially
challenging to conduct legal actions because, as a result of their
condition, they “may have difficulty standing up for themselves.”218
Indeed, it is crucial that a DV survivor with PTSD finds an
affordable attorney who screens for and understands DV.219 Studies
show that most litigants are typically “unrepresented because they
cannot afford to hire an attorney.” 220 Indeed, women, including
211

See Schwaeber, supra note 182, at 2-22 to -25.
See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 162-63.
213
See Schwaeber, supra note 182, at 2-22 to -25.
214
Freedman, supra note 126, at 598.
215
Freedman, supra note 126, at 598.
216
Freedman, supra note 126, at 599.
217
See Thomas E. Hornsby, Do judges Adequately Address the Causes and
Impact of Violence in Children’s Lives in Deciding Contested Child Custody
Cases?, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD CUSTODY 7-8 (Mo Therese
Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010).
218
Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 186.
219
Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 165.
220
See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 166.
212

DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L.

35

DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L.

VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1

[Vol. VI: 1

those who are DV victims, are “less likely to be represented than
men.”221 DV victims are at an even more disadvantaged position if
their abuser has an attorney and the victim does not. 222 In this
scenario, the DV victim is without a spokesperson and advocate and
the abuser’s attorney will most likely have “more access to financial
and other case related information.”223
DV victims are particularly likely to have their claims of
domestic violence minimized or dismissed outright due to a
prevailing view that the DV claim is “either [a] product of an
overreaction” to normal conflict within a marital dissolution, or,
worse, viewed by the court “as a manipulative tactic to gain an
unfair advantage.” 224 These barriers make the acquisition of a
quality, trained attorney a crucial piece to the litigation puzzle for
DV victims. Locating a quality attorney trained in domestic
violence abuse and coercive control tactics is the initial hurdle,
affording a properly qualified attorney is another matter entirely.225
DV victims, who are fortunate enough to find and retain the best,
most qualified attorney, still enter the legal system faced with
gender-biased courts that “continue to treat claims of domestic
violence with disdain, disbelief and dismissiveness.”226 Adding to
the hostile adversarial legal environment is the DV abuser who can
harass the DV victim with false accusations, intimidating his victim
into defending the falsely claimed deficiencies in trial.227
DV abusers can use the psychological stress by repeatedly
using court pleadings as a tactic to wear down DV victims. 228
Stressors that push DV victims to prematurely settle viable cases
include the discovery and exposure of humiliating events that
victims attempt to keep private, intimidating and embarrassing
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depositions and cross-examinations, and overtly hostile judges.229
Additionally, DV victims may feel a mounting pressure to settle
prematurely, or to compromise with an abuser to their detriment, all
the while believing that the abuse would cease if they were to
capitulate with their abuser. 230 If the DV victim is coerced into
ending the litigation prematurely, accepts a harmful and unjust
result, or withdraws her case due to re-victimization at the hands of
her abuser because of absolute privilege, the civil legal system is no
more than a charade and a sham, instituted to reward the abuser for
the harms inflicted against his victim.231
V.

ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE: THE COMMON LAW
DOCTRINE OF CONTINUED DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE

“‘[C]ourts rarely find lawyers’ statements irrelevant.’”232
DV abuse does not always find its way to the courthouse
steps. Of those cases that do, DV abusers are able to use the court’s
judicial proceedings to continue the abuse through “intimidation,
isolation, and control under the guise of litigation strategies.” 233
Abusers may gain access to their victims by repeatedly calling them
into court, exposing them to embarrassing questions in depositions,
and wearing them down with repetitive false accusations in court
pleadings. Due to the common law doctrine of absolute privilege,
abusers and their attorneys are immune from civil liability for
making false and defamatory statements about DV victims in a
judicial proceeding.234 Indeed, DV abusers can use the adversarial
legal system to degrade and threaten their victims without any fear
of civil consequences.235
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This article asserts that DV abusers can take advantage of
the absolute privilege in litigation, use the privilege to continue their
abuse of their victims within the civil legal system, and that this
behavior leads to additional harm for DV victims. Indeed, for
centuries, the absolute privilege has provided litigants, judges, and
attorneys with absolute immunity from civil law suits for
defamation, either in the form of the written or spoken word. Courts
have ruled that litigants, in an effort to seek the discovery of
evidence, may resort to ingenious methods to obtain the needed
relevant evidence.236 Examples of these ingenious methods include
tactics such as publishing defamatory statements, utilizing
threatening language in court documents, and intimidating the
opposing party through harassing communications that include
gratuitous verbal abuse or name calling.237 As a result, an abuser
may understand that he can legally utilize the absolute privilege as
an affirmative defense to justify his offensive and abusive actions
against his DV victim during the course of a dissolution of marriage
or any other judicial proceeding with her.238
Absolute privilege allows a DV abuser to continue to
traumatize his victim indefinitely through judicial proceedings,
which could often lead to further legal and health related injuries for
women who are suffering from PTSD due to DV.239 The DV abuser,
and his attorney, knows he has absolute privilege on his side during
the course of litigation and will use it to his advantage to continue
to maintain the power and control he has over his victim and to seek
unjust benefits in the litigation. 240 The utilization of absolute
privilege by a DV abuser against his victim is especially likely in
states where absolute privilege has been expanded beyond its
common law form. The expansion of absolute privilege essentially
gives DV abusers a legal license to re-victimize the very people the
court system is trying to protect. Indeed, the trauma experienced by
236
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a DV victim may often lead to injuries including PTSD, a
recognized disability entitled to protection under the Americans
with Disabilities Act.241 Specifically, Title II of the ADA requires
public entities to reasonably modify their rules, policies, practices,
or services to accommodate the individual with a disability, such as
PTSD, so that discrimination thereto is prevented. 242 Such
reasonable modifications by public entities are necessary for people
with disabilities to fully exercise their legal rights.243
The absolute privilege was initially used to protect accusers
who alleged criminal acts from being sued for defamation, or
through an action for “‘scandalum magnatum,’ or slander,” brought
by the accused.244 However, the once narrow privilege articulated
in an English court in 1497, later adopted in colonial American
common law, has been expanded in modern jurisprudence to
include any and all conduct by litigation parties and attorneys.245
Indeed, the focus on defamatory words involved in litigation has
broadened to include acts that, otherwise, would constitute tortious
acts had they not been committed in some form or fashion in a
judicial proceeding.246 In fact, to utilize the affirmative defense of
absolute privilege, one may simply claim that the statements or acts
arose with only the barest of rational relevancy to the litigation with
which the statements or acts are connected.247
Absolute privilege has been expanded to apply to any
statements or conduct occurring in connection with litigation, such
as preparing expert witnesses for testimony and communications
thereto, communications and actions related to settlement
241

See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 1213112132 (amended 2008). See also Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 742.
242
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12131-32; See also Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra
note 17.
243
42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12131-32.
244
Simms v. Seaman, 69 A.3d 880, 885 (Conn. 2013).
245
Simms, 69 A.3d at 885. See generally Levin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 639
So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1994).
246
See generally Levin, 639 So. 2d. 606 (Fla. 1994).
247
See T. Leigh Aneson, Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for
Litigation Lawyers, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 915, 933 (2004).
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agreements, as well as failure to properly maintain a client’s
confidential information.248 The application of absolute privilege by
courts is grounded in public policy and is “essential to the need for
unencumbered administration of justice.” 249 Whether absolute
privilege applies in a given situation is a matter of law to be
determined by the trial court.250 The ability for a court to determine
whether the affirmative defense of absolute privilege applies to a
person, whom the privilege is meant to protect, “allows courts to
dismiss cases . . . at the earliest possible stage in the litigation.”251
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish
defamatory matter concerning another in
communications preliminary to a proposed judicial
proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the
course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in
which he participates as counsel, if it has some
relation to the proceeding.252
The courts have the responsibility to monitor the privilege by
regulating the actions of litigants and attorneys under its duty to
“protect the public, the [legal] profession, and the administration of
justice.” 253 However, such regulation is typically carried out
through the courts’ internal sanctions within the litigation or
through disciplinary proceedings against an officer of the court, i.e.
an attorney, rather than having another court allow a party to the
litigation to file a separate legal action against the opposing party or
attorneys.254 One of the purposes of absolute privilege is to limit the
liability and to protect attorneys for their actions during the course
of representation of a party to litigation.255
248

See generally Aneson, supra note 248.
Jernigan, supra note 24, at 360.
250
Aneson, supra note 248, at 918.
251
See Aneson, supra note 248, at 921
252
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977).
253
Jernigan, supra note 24, at 366.
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See Id. at 916.
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The absolute privilege was initially envisioned to “protect
litigants, witnesses, attorneys, and judges” from frivolous suits
brought as retribution or to gain an advantage in associated
litigation; but judicial discretion is the only real constraint on what
may become abusive, unfair, and defamatory actions.256 Use of the
absolute privilege was meant to safeguard the adversarial legal
system from disruptions to the litigation process.257 By providing
protection from liability, absolute privilege allows litigants, their
attorneys, and all other participants to perform their respective
judiciary functions without interference from tort claims brought by
defamed parties. 258 Defamatory statements made by litigants or
attorneys that are irrelevant to the judicial proceedings may not be
protected by the absolute privilege. However, the relevancy of
defamatory statements are determined by the court as a question of
law.259 If there are any doubts as to the relevance of an attorney’s
defamatory statements, the benefit of the doubts are resolved in
favor of the attorney who made the statements.260 Consequently,
the privilege removes the possibility of a successful claim by a
defamed party against an attorney for civil liability. In practice,
however, the privilege protects litigators and provides “them with a
license to lie, cheat, or steal” because they know they are immune
from liability for their statements and actions within the confines of
a judicial proceeding.261
Historically, courts have applied a liberal construction of
absolute privilege which has become so broad that it has virtually
no constraint at all. Attorneys who have been found to have made
“false misrepresentations, manufactur[ed] evidence, and
present[ed] perjured testimony” have been ruled to be immune from
lawsuits for their actions. 262 Attorneys are afforded absolute
256

See King, supra note 5, at 169.
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privilege for defamatory statements that are made in the course of,
or simply related to, a judicial proceeding. 263 Absolute privilege
“applies regardless of malice, bad faith, or any nefarious motives on
the part of the lawyer so long as the conduct complained of has some
relation to the litigation.”264 When a litigant or his attorney invokes
the absolute privilege as an affirmative defense in a law suit brought
against him for defamation or tortious acts, “it is irrelevant whether
the defamatory material is true or false, and it is further irrelevant
whether the individual making the defamatory statement knew such
information was false.”265 Generally, any egregious behavior by an
attorney needing reprimand is handled by the court through
sanctions or by the state bar association through formal disciplinary
proceedings rather than by limiting the privilege.266
The expansion of the application of absolute privilege
throughout the U.S. judicial system can result in significant harm to
the party upon which the defamatory statements and tortious acts
are directed. 267 Indeed, for anyone who is the victim of such,
otherwise, actionable offenses, it violates the very concept of
fairness and justice.268 Certainly, when a judge or jury bases the
outcome of a case on malicious falsehoods and witnesses or parties,
263

See Jernigan, supra note 24, at 371.
Aneson, supra note 248, at 918.
265
Jernigan, supra note 24, at 360.
266
See Aneson, supra note 248, at 925. See generally Levin, et al., 639 So. 2d.
606 (explains that absolute privilege is a powerful doctrine that shields litigants
and their attorneys from civil liability despite malice by the actor or tremendous
harm to the victim. Levin expanded the absolute privilege to apply to any cause
of action that includes words as well as actions inside and outside the courtroom.
The Florida Supreme Court extended absolute privilege in Florida beyond its
historically defined limits and set up a circumstance whereby the Florida Supreme
Court implicitly condones unethical and abusive litigation conduct by attorneys
and others. Indeed, the Florida courts, as well as many other states such as
California, Indiana, and New Jersey recognize that absolute privilege applies to
both statements and acts, a broad interpretation that was not originally
contemplated by the common law doctrine. It also applies to cases arising from
statutory law as well as common law, with both federal and state courts following
this expansive application of the affirmative defense.).
267
Keith Clausen, Case Comment, Levin v. United States Fire Ins., Co., 639 So.
2d 606 (Fla. 1994), 46 FLA. L. REV. 687 (1994).
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See Clausen, supra note 268.
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who are subjected to harassing and threatening treatment by officers
of the court who act with impunity, it is difficult to imagine a
situation where a fair and just legal process has occurred. However,
this outrageous and abusive behavior is particularly damaging and
offensive in the family law court system where the raw emotional
nature of the parties runs very high, and it is especially likely to
occur because of the discretion afforded family law court judges.269
DV abusers can use absolute privilege to re-victimize their
victims without concern over legal repercussions.270 Through the
protection of absolute privilege as an affirmative defense to any
lawsuit brought against him for statements and actions made against
a DV victim, an attorney can defame, harass, and threaten her during
the course of litigation or in connection with contemplated
litigation; and he is immune from liability for the defamatory
statement by using the affirmative defense of absolute privilege.271
The net effect of absolute privilege is the manipulation by DV
abusers of the family law court system and the denial of DV victims’
equal protection of the laws.272 This creates an even greater power
and control imbalance between the abuser and his victim, resulting
in gender inequalities within the court. Absolute privilege can
exacerbate the already difficult tasks facing DV victims who cannot
handle the seemingly simplest of perfunctory legal requirements
with rational thought.273 Simultaneously, the DV victim knows that
the abuser is signaling to her that she is under his power and control,
causing her to view his abusiveness as omnipresent.274
The continued reinforcement of the absolute privilege
doctrine by appellate courts and the expansion of the doctrine to
privilege any and all communications and actions by parties within
a proceeding, or contemplated proceeding, places DV victims in a
precarious position of vulnerability and places DV abusers in a
269

See Clausen, supra note 268; See also King, supra note 5.
See King, supra note 5, at 169.
271
See King, supra note 5, at 168-69.
272
See King, supra note 5, at 168.
273
See Dragiewicz, supra note 92, at 5-8 to -9.
274
See King, supra note 5.
270

DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L.

43

DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L.

VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1

[Vol. VI: 1

position of power. 275 Courts favor employing a liberal rule in
finding communications or actions absolutely privileged. 276
Cavalierly, courts rule that because litigation is adversarial,
“‘[f]eelings are often wounded and reputations are sometimes
maligned.’” 277 The absolute privilege doctrine expansion is
generally justified by the concept that “an occasional unfair result,
fraudulent communication, or perjured testimony was the price to
be paid for free access to the courts without fear of harassing
derivative tort actions.”278 This justification fails to recognize that a
DV victim, who suffers with PTSD, has her fundamental right to
free access to the courts infringed upon when a blind application of
absolute privilege is given to a DV abuser whose intent is to harass
and intimidate his victim within the judicial system.279
If courts blindly apply a liberal interpretation of absolute
privilege to all actions and communications committed by a DV
abuser, a DV victim with PTSD is unable to withstand the onslaught
from her abuser and is unable to realize a just result. A DV abuser
can shield himself from tort actions and institute illegitimate
litigation strategies for the purposes of harming his victim through
abusive and harassing language deployed through court documents,
as well as interrogatory and deposition questions. A DV abuser can
force his victim to defend baseless accusations in pleadings, costing
his victim time, money, and peace of mind; the types of resources a
DV victim rarely possesses.
The alternative to allowing tort actions as remedies for
litigants who are wronged within a civil litigation dispute is the
court’s power to sanction a party or attorney.280 Family law courts
275
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N. E.2d 989, 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)).
278
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are given wide discretion to evaluate what constitutes sanctionable
conduct.281 Unfortunately, conduct that typically rises to the level
of outrageousness that will draw punitive sanctions from a family
law court are well beyond the boundaries of tolerable conduct for a
DV victim with PTSD. 282 Courts deciding whether to sanction
litigants or attorneys for egregious conduct weigh the conduct next
to a reasonable person standard, a standard based on gendered
foundations and meant to cover actions experienced by individuals
not diagnosed with PTSD stemming from DV.283 As a result of the
DV from her abuser who she now faces in court, the DV victim with
PTSD has damaged tolerance levels which are far below the
tolerance levels associated with a reasonable person standard. 284
Courts that neglect to apply a subjective standard of conduct, based
upon what a DV victim with PTSD can tolerate, does the victim a
disservice by failing to administer justice properly.285
VI.

THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A
PATH TO RELIEF FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
VICTIMS WITH PTSD

“Pursuing one’s rights under the ADA constitutes a protected
activity.”286
The Americans with Disabilities Act was signed into law by
President George H. W. Bush on July 26, 1990.287 President Bush
281
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recognized that people with disabilities made up the largest minority
group in the United States.288 At the time, the ADA was considered
a piece of landmark legislation because it was passed, in part, to
ensure disabled persons’ acceptance into places of public
accommodations.289
A. What is the ADA?
The ADA was enacted to “eliminate discrimination against
individuals with disabilities” as well as to ensure the federal
governments’ enforcement of the law.290 Specifically, Title II of the
ADA ensures that individuals with disabilities are protected against
discrimination, including in places of public services such as state
court systems.291 Title II states: “[N]o qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.” 292 “Title II . . . prohibits ‘public entities’ from
discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability . . . As
public entities, state court systems are mandated by the ADA to
address the needs of people with functional limitations and provide
them equal access to justice.”293 Title II ensures that people with
disabilities have an “active[] and meaningful[] participat[ion] in the
state judicial system.”294
The justice system is an institution that provides hope to
those who have found none anywhere else for injuries suffered in

288
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the context of economics, politics, or social status.295 Fair access to
courts is considered a fundamental right in any system of
government where justice remains a vital core value.296 However,
access to justice has been a struggle for people with disabilities, who
still labor to obtain any form of meaningful participation in our
legal system. 297 When amending the ADA in 2008, Congress
acknowledged that individuals with disabilities often experience
discrimination for which they have “no legal recourse to redress
such discrimination.” 298 Still, despite the passage of the ADA,
barriers to meaningful access to justice for people with disabilities
still remain, resulting in some individuals with disabilities being
denied relevant, substantial participation in court proceedings.299
The ADA requires that state court systems make its facilities
and programs accessible to qualified individuals with disabilities.300
As barriers to participation are discovered, the ADA mandates that
a state court system “must reasonably modify its policies, practices
or procedures to allow participation by a person with a
disability.” 301 Historically, disabled persons have been denied
active participation in the courts and equal protection of the laws.302
However, under the ADA, no individual with a qualified disability
shall be denied complete participation in the judicial system or be
discriminated against due to the nature of their disability.303
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B. Under the ADA: What is a Disabled Person and
what constitutes discrimination?
Under the ADA, to qualify as an individual with a disability,
that individual must have “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual.”304 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 focuses on the
disability’s impairment of an individual’s substantial limitation of
one major life activity and does not require more than one activity’s
substantial limitation in order to qualify as a disability under the
ADA. 305 Historically, for psychiatric conditions, courts used
diagnoses from the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual when evaluating whether a specific
condition meets the impairment criteria of the ADA.306 Diagnoses
that courts recognize as potentially disabling include, but are not
limited to, “major psychiatric diseases such as schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, and depression, as well as most of the anxiety
disorders such as panic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder,
claustrophobia, and agoraphobia.”307 The legislative history of the
ADA makes clear that a person is qualified for protection if one has,
among others, an “emotional illness.” 308 Further, a litigant, who,
because of “brain injuries,” cannot adequately and consistently
communicate with her attorney, is “incapable of assisting in a
meaningful way in the conduct of a civil case . . . [and] is therefore
disabled, within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).”309
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Judges will frequently employ sanist beliefs in decisionmaking. 310 By doing so, they incorporate sanist beliefs by using
erroneous “‘common sense’, heuristic reasoning, and biased
stereotyping” to rationalize their rulings.311 Sanism is grounded in
“myths, superstitions, and de-individualization.” 312 Judges who
demand strict adherence to courtroom rules and procedures may
employ sanist attitudes and behavior when punishing litigants who
do not conform to courtroom decorum.313 As discussed above, such
discriminatory behavior by judges is particularly precarious for DV
victims with PTSD due to the multiple negative stereotypes of
gender bias and sanist beliefs against PTSD.314 The U.S. Supreme
Court, in School Board. of Nassau County v. Arline, opined that the
ignorant behavior and sanist attitudes can be “as handicapping as
the physical limitations which flow from the impairment.” 315 An
inflexible judge implementing insensitive and rigid courtroom
procedures runs afoul of discriminatory and unjust treatment against
the entire disabled community.316
C. Under the ADA: When federal law is superior to
the absolute privilege
The ADA, a federal civil rights law analogous to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, is superior to state laws when an actual conflict
exists.317 In Pardi v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, the U.S. Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals heard a discrimination dispute based upon
310
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311
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315
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a conflict with absolute privilege under state and federal law.318 The
Ninth Circuit in Pardi reaffirmed that when the purposes and
objectives of a federal law are stymied by state law, the federal law
must prevail. 319 Additionally, the Pardi court stated that actions
taken by persons, which are wrongful under federal law, cannot be
held as protected from liability by a state immunity statute.320
The plaintiff in Pardi, suffering from depression, a mental
disorder recognized by the ADA, asserted that the ADA provided a
remedy from harm caused by discriminatory conduct by the
defendant. 321 The defendant asserted that the absolute privilege
under state law provided immunity from liability. 322 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed with the defendant and held that, because of the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the state absolute
privilege statute did not immunize the defendant. 323 In fact, the
Pardi court clearly held that the ADA’s provisions ensure
protection for disabled persons who experience any failure of
accommodations covered under the ADA.324 This ruling suggests
that the state doctrine of absolute privilege would not protect those
who are liable for any violation of the ADA during the course of
litigation, especially in the case of a lack of accommodations for a
DV victim with PTSD.325 Thus, modifications for a DV victim, who
suffers from PTSD, is a realistic solution to the problem of
continuing to place DV victims in the position of being revictimized through abusive court procedures, especially when
absolute privilege provides unfettered access to the victim by the
abuser. Under the ADA, a DV victim with PTSD is safeguarded
from the continued abuse by a DV abuser within the forum of
litigation, a state run public entity.

318
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D. Under the ADA: Court Accommodations for
PTSD?
In the twenty-five plus years since the enactment of the
ADA, public accommodations for people with disabilities has seen
an ever growing sensitivity to “architectural barriers faced by
physically challenged persons.” 326 It is extremely common, for
example, to find wheelchair accessible ramps to sidewalks, retail
stores, and many other public areas. 327 It is an understandable
heuristic response to look for “commonly accepted solutions” for
accommodations, like ramps for wheelchair accessibility, braille
placards for sight impairment, and sign language use for hearing
impairment. 328 Judges will often think of other “commonly
accepted methods of accommodation when determining individual
needs within the courtroom.” 329 It stands to reason, then, that a
litigant “who is not [overtly] physically challenged, but has a mental
or emotional impairment . . . has a more difficult task when seeking
accommodations.”330
The ADA requires public entities, which includes all courts,
“to avoid discrimination against persons with disabilities and to
make reasonable modifications in order to accommodate
individuals with disabilities.”331 “The ADA requires . . . reasonable
accommodations and covers not only those policies and procedures
that intentionally exclude those with disabilities, but also ‘facially
neutral barriers’ that work to discriminate against these
individuals.”332 The ADA demands nothing less than the integration
of courtroom procedures for people with disabilities.333 The ADA’s
requirement on courts to modify processes and procedures for
326
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people with disabilities is subject to the ADA’s “‘fundamental
alterations in the services provided’ and ‘undue burden’
exception.”334
If a DV victim with PTSD has problems conforming to the
strict rules of the local courthouse, what kinds of accommodations
would be viable?335 As a start, the trial judge could allow frequent
breaks, time spent with a support person like a therapist, and
limitations on courtroom observers. 336 A DV victim with PTSD
could benefit from court instructions that were broken down into
smaller steps, the court could provide positive feedback to the DV
victim, and the court could modify the courtroom procedures to
accommodate the PTSD sufferer’s limited attention span. 337
Additionally, the court could “arrange for morning and afternoon
transcripts” for a DV victim with PTSD “who is confused by verbal
instructions or who has short-term memory loss.” 338
Accommodations for litigants, who suffer from brain injuries such
as PTSD, could be implemented to allow for their “safety and
comfort and be cared for properly during the proceedings.” 339 It
would be difficult to imagine that accommodations for at least
medical support would fundamentally alter the nature of the court
proceeding. 340 Moreover, the court’s understanding that the DV
victim with PTSD may utilize a service dog is helpful as well as the
fact that in camera hearings may be needed when she is required to
testify. Eliminating the burden from having to face her abuser,
otherwise placed on the DV victim suffering from PTSD, will allow
the court to see her in a less agitated state, placing all sides of the
litigation on more equal footing.
Ultimately, the burden to provide reasonable
accommodations in court for a DV victim with PTSD falls on the
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presiding judge. 341 It is required that the court holding the
proceeding give primary consideration to the requests of the
individual with the disability when determining what types of
accommodations are necessary.342 Most likely, an accommodation
request from a DV victim with PTSD would come prior to the
commencement of a courtroom proceeding through a written
motion filed with the court and provided to opposing counsel.343
However, the court may need to make accommodation rulings sua
sponte in the event that the circumstances warrant such an action.344
By filing a written motion requesting accommodations, it allows the
court to rule using a written order to preserve the request for
possible appellate rights. 345 An accommodations request is
reviewed under a reasonableness test by the court and is subject to
analysis as to whether the request would “‘fundamentally alter the
nature of the activity’ or [if] the accommodation [would] place[]
and [sic] undue financial or administrative burden on the [court].”346
However, modifications to court procedures and reasonable
accommodations do not equate to high monetary expenditures and
may simply require procedural flexibility.347
If an accommodations request is denied, “the regulations
state that the decision to refuse an accommodation must be made by
a high-level official who has budgetary authority and responsibility
for making spending decisions.”348 Although courts are not required
to authorize modifications to procedures or accommodations that
“result in a ‘fundamental alteration of [a] program or service, or
341
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cause an ‘undue financial or administrative burden,’”349 the court
administration has the “burden of proof to establish financial or
administrative hardship, or the demonstration that the
accommodation would result in a fundamental alteration in the
nature of the service, program, or activity.”350 Ominously, if a court
refuses to consider necessary accommodations for a DV victim with
PTSD, it is likely that the functioning capabilities of the victim will
be reduced.351 Most likely, this inaction by the court will lead to the
DV victim with PTSD experiencing an “inability to understand,
follow, or actively participate in the proceedings,” requiring her to
find an ADA attorney to work to enforce her legal rights under the
ADA.352
VII.

CONCLUSION

Domestic violence, a part of a pattern of power and control
by men, has economic, societal and legal impacts that are
devastating to women.353 As previously discussed, DV may often
lead to PTSD in victims which can negatively affect outcomes in
court for the victims.354 Abusers will frequently continue to abuse
their DV victims within the legal system through the perversion of
absolute privilege, resulting in disastrous outcomes for the victim
suffering from PTSD.355 The family law courts can be an extremely
hostile environment for DV victims in which the adversarial nature
of litigation favors the abuser. 356 Gender and litigation biases
permeate the family law courts and create a condition in which a
DV victim with PTSD may agree to a settlement, to her detriment,
to avoid the agonizing litigation process as well as gambling on a
349
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family law judge who is often overwhelmed, has immense
discretion, and is suspicious of her presentation in court due to her
PTSD.357
In order to cause the institution of law to become a more
effective and just apparatus for women who are DV victims, more
women and men in the legal community must choose and execute a
plan that pushes back against the boundaries of the male legal view
that currently dominates the law.358 To compensate for the gendered
nature of law and the inherently adversarial nature of the legal
system, reforms to the affirmative defense of the absolute privilege
provided to abusers within the family law system should be
implemented to protect injured DV victims who suffer from PTSD.
Absolute privilege and the abusive nature of the adversarial system
should be modified in those instances involving DV victims whose
traumatic experiences have severely injured them psychologically.

357
358

See Freedman, supra note 126.
See Finley, supra note 31, at 386 (emphasis added).

